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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the propositions put forward by Aaron Wildavsky that spending departments 
within a public organization try to expand their budgets for better services, while the policy making committee 
tries to guard against budgetary expansion, giving the standard reasoning that there are insufficient public funds 
available to allocate towards all of the requested departmental budgets. The principal contribution of this article 
has been to further explore participants’ roles in the budget process. The pre-existing literature on this topic 
suggest that department heads do act as advocates for their departments and that policy committee does act as the 
guardian. To overcome the conflict between advocates and guardian, the heuristics of incremental theory such as 
fairness and precedent need to be used. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of budgetary roles has been well developed in the literature on incremental budgeting. A volume of 
literature focuses on budgetary roles as a very important aspect in government budgetary decision making. In the 
Politics of the Budgetary Process, Aaron Wildavsky details at length the roles of departments as “advocates”, 
budget officers as “cutters” and appropriation committees as “reviewers”. Roles are one core concept of the 
incremental theory. Incremental theory makes reference to the roles of the budget decision makers, further 
making the assumption that these roles are defined, that players do not change the nature of the roles very much 
and that role players take a fairly narrow view of their roles. A feature of the role phenomenon is that 
departments try to expand their budgets and the finance directorate/ committee tries to guard against budgetary 
expansion.  
 
2. Departments’ Budget Role 
Anton’s study, The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois, was published in 1966. In that study, Anton 
essentially confirmed Wildavsky’s (1964) previous findings. He found that in Illinois, incrementalism provided 
by a better explanation of the budgetary process than did the Rational Model. According to Anton, programme 
related values were unimportant. The simple decision rules followed by the state budget analysts were to make 
marginal adjustments to the base. Moreover, Anton (1966) stated four rules for preparing and submitting budgets. 
1) Avoid requests for sums smaller than the current appropriation. 
2) Put as much as possible of the new request (particularly items with top priority) into the basic 
budget. 
3) Increases that are desired should be made to appear small and should appear to grow out of 
existing operations (the appearance of fundamental change should be avoided). 
4) Give the budgetary commission something to cut. 
Anton concluded that “very few responsible agency administrators will be likely to request less money than 
is currently available to them. Crecine (1969) stated that the objective of a department director is: “to obtain the 
largest possible amount of funds for his department and his purposes”. 
 
3. Department Advocacy 
Local government is a synthesis of semi-autonomous units that come together to form the organization as a 
whole. Each of the departments has its own goals, its own values, and its own interests. Each provides different 
services to the community and naturally desires to expand the scope of its activities, and to improve its financial 
position (Friedman 1975). 
Wildavsky (1964) was the first writer who laid emphasis on the roles that the participants in the process 
carve out for themselves. He also pointed to the reasons why these roles are not strictly adhered to. A department 
acts as an advocate for its programmes and there are a multitude of variations on the advocacy theme. Officers 
consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as highly competent individuals who demonstrate a high degree 
of professionalism in carrying out the responsibilities that their roles require. They are in a position and a level of 
experience where they can best determine the needs and wants of their departments.  
Collins et al (1987) found that departmental heads use the last period’s budgetary appropriation as a 
baseline or starting point. They prefer to defend existing budgetary levels or seek only incremental changes in 
their budgetary requests. 
Savoie (1990) has applied Wildavsky’s “Guardian-Advocate” framework. He found that spending 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.8, No.1, 2018 
 
43 
departments in Canada, act as advocates for their programs and for increase spending while central agencies, 
such as the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board secretariat try as best they can to exert control on 
spending as guardians of the Treasury.  
Imbeau (2005) empirically tested of Wildavsky’s guardian-advocate model of budgetary process. His 
hypothesis was that the speeches of ministries of Finance are systematically different from speeches of ministries 
of Education or Health on certain specific aspects. To test his hypothesis, he performed the content analysis on 
130 policy speeches delivered in the Quebec National Assembly from 1970 to 2004. His conclusion was that 
there are significant traces of budgetary role-playing in policy speeches in Quebec and that the intensity of role-
playing varies with political parties. 
Departments, pursuing an advocacy role orientation, seek increases in their appropriations. However, there 
is a narrow range of funding increases that they can request. If they ask for too much, they stand to lose the 
confidence of other political actors and subsequently the ability to achieve desired appropriation levels. If they 
ask for too little, the finance directorate is likely to oblige them by cutting part of their meagre request. Hence, 
departments base their requests on a strategy which incorporates expectations and prediction of other actor’s 
behaviour so as to achieve optimal appropriation results. 
In his book, The Politics of Public Money, Good (2007) sheds new light on the role of insiders in 
influencing government’s spending and explores the interactions among budget players and, perhaps the most 
central of all, the relationship between Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. He examines the extent to which 
influence by players in the budgetary process is shifting from a bilateral relationship between departmental 
spenders and central guardians to a more complex multilateral relationship involving spenders and central 
guardians, as well as priority setters and financial watchdogs. 
3.1 Satisfaction with budget allocation. Naturally, officials are affected by the environment in which they 
operate. This affects the two groups of actors (Advocates and Guardians). As a consequence, these 
actors play their roles in response to the nature of the environment, which surrounds them. If the 
officials agree on their own and other members roles and act in conformity with them, they may reduce 
their calculations and other efforts in the budgetary process and gaining greater level of satisfaction 
from their participation in the budgetary process. When they adopt the incremental methods and 
procedures to simplify their calculations using the precedent and fair share rules, department heads can 
be more satisfied with the budgetary process. 
3.2 Spending evaluation. Another way to gain deeper insight into the dynamics of the advocate role is to 
look at the officials’ perception regarding the level of spending. Department officials believe that the 
money allocated to their departments are acceptable, when they obtain the same level of last year’s 
expenditure plus the increases requested. They could be satisfied by receiving the same level of last 
year’s expenditure plus an increment. Finally, officials will be unsatisfied when the money allocated to 
their departments was lacking in any incremental increases. 
Spending department as a part of promoting their department’s activities is to seek larger appropriations 
from one year to the next. This led them to play a bureaucratic politician role in addition to their role as 
professional people, in order to preserve earlier achievements and promote new policies. Thus, it is of 
utmost importance that officials possess the necessary political and negotiation skills to successfully 
defend their budgetary claims during the inevitable debates that would result as their claims passed 
through finance committee meetings. 
3.3 Preferred budget setting philosophy. This issue involves a budget philosophy that a departmental 
manager would like to apply in the budgetary process. Three possible options can be suggested: 
1. Base Maintenance. “I want to at least be able to maintain my programs at the current level of 
operation.” A department using a maintenance strategy would be interested in maintaining its 
current level of program activities. Therefore, it would claim its last year’s allocation plus an 
allowance for inflation. 
2. Fair Share philosophy. “I would like to be sure my department/program receives its full share of 
any additional monies available.” A department using a fair share strategy would try to be sure it 
received its proportionate share of all new funds raised by the organization. 
3. Expansion Philosophy. “I want to expand my programs or add new ones whenever I can.” A 
department using an expansion strategy would not see a need to be constrained by factors such as 
inflation. Nor would it see a need to be particularly reasonable in its claims. 
Overall, the dominance of these three philosophies indicate that to great extent department officials define 
their particular part in the budget system as that of the advocate of their activities, goals, and spending levels.  
 
4. Guardian Role 
The main role of the finance committee or a finance directorate is to consider the detailed estimates of the 
program or area committees and present a summary to the policy committee of the overall financial situation.  
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In the budgetary process the finance directorate sets resource expectation levels for each department within 
an organization. These resource expectation levels specify what kind of budget that departments can make. There 
are three categories:  
1. Resource Reduction. A department will be asked to present a reduced budget.  
2. Standstill Budget. A department will be asked to manage at the same budget level as in the previous 
year. 
3. Strategic Allocation. A department may get additional resources for specific activities linked to the 
city’s strategic plan.  
Top management’s goals have been to save money by spending less. Thus, continuity and consistency in 
expenditure is the symbol of an incremental control orientation to budgeting. This year’s budget is based upon 
last year’s appropriation. The future is not more than an elongation of the past as the present is a continuation of 
what has gone so far. 
The “Guardian” role can be seen when officials are asked to make savings in some activities in order to 
increase the expenditure for others. This shows the endeavour of the Policy Committee in capping the level of 
the expenditure at an early stage of the process. Containment rules imposed by the Finance Committee before 
departments prepare their budgets are more likely to prevent departments attempts to negotiate individual 
program changes through a process of partisan mutual adjustment based on relative program merit. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The roles played by the different participants act as co-ordinating mechanisms in the budgeting process. Officials 
are expected to play the role of advocate for activities. The Finance Department/Policy Committee takes the role 
of protector of the public purse. The patterns of mutual expectations markedly reduce the burden of calculation. 
To reduce the conflict between the advocates and guardians and increase the level of satisfaction in the 
budgetary process for both of them, two heuristics have to be used. The first one is called the fair share heuristic. 
This heuristic states that if one is to reconcile competing claims and yet satisfy everyone minimally, at least most 
of the time, then one must see to it that everyone gets a “fair share”. However, fairness cannot be defined purely 
in the abstract, it must have some operational content to rely on for clarity. This is provided by the use of the 
second heuristic, which Lindblom (1959) has stressed as crucial, the heuristic of precedent. The way precedent 
works is as follows. If I have been getting about the same slice of pie all the while, then I certainly believe I will 
be entitled to at least that much this time, and if I am willing to recognize that my colleagues have a legitimate 
claim of the same sort, then a “fair” slice this time would be pretty much what I got last time, percentage-wise. 
So precedent is followed. These two interdependent heuristics help to significantly reduce interdepartmental 
conflict by giving each department their “fair share” which is determined by the historical proportions or 
percentages of the government budget that each department receives. 
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